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ABSTRACT 
The ongoing economic downturn in the United States has negatively impacted individual 
homeowners’ ability to repay their mortgage debt.  This is particularly true of low and 
moderate income borrowers, a segment of the purchasing population that expanded 
considerably during the homeownership boom of 2000 - 2007.4  Between 2007 and 2011 more 
than 13 million mortgages entered some type of default mitigation or workout process.  
Despite this intense effort to mitigate home loss among at-risk borrowers, as of February 2011 
roughly 2.7 million residential borrowers were 60+ days delinquent, and that number continues 
to rise.8  Urban planning professionals involved in housing, along with economic development 
advocates and policymakers, want to understand how well foreclosure mitigation strategies 
work, and which strategies are most effective.   
Foreclosure counseling is a particularly popular method for slowing the rise in mortgage 
default.  However, further research is necessary to identify which counseling methods provide 
the most benefit to homeowners.  This paper studied a representative foreclosure counseling 
agency, analyzing their experimental approach to the counseling process.  The agency, in 
addition to standard counseling and financial education services, attempted to alter their 
clients’ spending behaviors.  The innovation was reducing mortgage default and default 
recidivism among foreclosure counseling clients by making those clients more aware of how 
spending behaviors impact their ability to pay debt liabilities.  In the following study, I explored 
the efficacy of this strategy. 
Overall, I found that the experimental behavior modification program was statistically 
correlated to higher home retention than standard counseling treatment.  Moreover, when 
counselors couple the behavior modification with a sustainable mortgage modification, the 
client is highly likely to remain in their home despite previous default history.  The spending 
behavior modification program is a replicable strategy that planners, policy makers, and 
economic development professionals should consider when creating foreclosure mitigation 
plans in their home municipalities. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The ongoing economic downturn in the United States has negatively impacted individual 
homeowners’ ability of to repay their mortgage debt.  Concern about mortgage lending to 
economically vulnerable households has led to a re-examination of policies at the federal, state, 
and local level that seek to expand homeownership. Some people have given up on 
homeownership as a wealth-building strategy for low and moderate income (LMI) individuals 
and families.  The culpability of high-cost, subprime, Alt-A, and other exotic loan products in the 
foreclosure crisis has been well documented, especially among those in the LMI category.1    
On the other hand, evidence is emerging that, under the right conditions, LMI 
households can successfully attain and maintain homeownership.   Overall, there is evidence 
that participating in homebuyer education and counseling informs potential homebuyers about 
the buying process, empowers them to interact in their best interest with other actors in the 
home buying process, and provides them with a counselor-advocate in the process when 
needed.  Many research institutions, including the UNC Center for Community Capital, have 
found qualitative and quantitative evidence of benefits of pre-purchase counseling and 
education.13   
Many of these conclusions are also applicable to foreclosure counseling services.26  
Research suggests that education and empowerment could have alleviated many defaults that 
resulted from borrowers’ misjudgments about their ability to afford particular mortgages, or 
their vulnerability to predatory sales of unsustainable loan products.  Logically, those at risk of 
default or currently in default could also benefit from counseling and education services that 
would increase their financial literacy.   
As the rate of mortgage foreclosure has risen, the Obama administration has tried 
several methods to slow the pace of homeownership loss through counseling.  This assistance 
includes financial education, advising on financial options, and direct casework with mortgage 
servicers.  Congress recently created a new Office of Housing Counseling within the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, generating a need for new knowledge about counseling 
best practices.2     
The Research Question and Findings 
Urban planning professionals involved in housing issues, along with economic 
development advocates and policymakers are concerned with how well foreclosure counseling 
services work, and which methods of counseling provide the most benefit.  With governments 
and private stakeholders expanding the capacity of foreclosure counseling, there has been a 
recent explosion of new and expanded counseling programs across the country.  Any 
innovations created by these evolving programs could potentially help to resolve the systemic, 
industry-level problems with LMI housing procurement that have been exposed during the 
current crisis.  This paper identifies and analyzes one innovation that has the potential for 
replication as a foreclosure counseling best practice.   
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The paper begins with a summary of the LMI foreclosure problem in the United States, 
and briefly describes supply-side policies under consideration as responses to the foreclosure 
problem.  Note that the discussion does not expand beyond policies related to foreclosure 
mitigation, because a broader discussion of economy-stabilizing policies is outside the context 
of this paper.  Next, the paper expands on the concept of counseling and financial education as 
one supply-side method to reduce instances of foreclosure, including a summary of the relevant 
academic literature.   
The second half of the paper analyzes a particularly promising foreclosure counseling 
program innovation through a case study.  A NeighborWorks grantee agency, HomeFree USA, 
tested a new program in which they modified the traditional counseling techniques by adding a 
behavior modification component.  HomeFree’s intent is to enhance the impact of mortgage 
counseling for people who can achieve a mortgage modification by altering their spending 
behaviors.   They believe better spending patterns, combined with accurate budgeting, will 
increase homeowners’ ability to service their mortgage and maintain their home. 
A statistical analysis of data provided by HomeFree shows that the innovative behavior 
modification program makes counseled borrowers more likely to remain in their home.  The 
analysis also supports other research that counseled borrowers who receive a sustainable 
modification to their mortgage are more likely to remain in their home.  The analysis further 
indicates that combining mortgage modification assistance with the behavior modification 
counseling is a highly effective method of keeping borrowers in their homes despite previous 
mortgage default or a high risk of future mortgage default. 
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CHAPTER 2: WHY WORRY ABOUT FORECLOSURES? 
The relatively recent, yet historically significant, economic crisis in the United States and 
other global economies will have lasting impacts on American domestic policy for several 
generations to come.  The most obvious example of that impact is the Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, more commonly known as Dodd-Frank, which broadly 
expands the powers of government to regulate banks and quasi-financial entities operating in 
the consumer finance industry.  However, there are many other policy debates raging in the 
United States today that will have equal or larger impacts on the future of our economy and 
day-to-day livelihoods.   
The current debates over whether or not the federal government should continue to 
intervene in United States’ housing markets is a prime example of these high level and far 
reaching debates.  Most economists and policy makers agree that the loss of value in American 
homes since 2007 is a disturbing trend, but many debate how to relieve the downward 
pressures on pricing.  Most value stabilization plans have one common thread: slow the 
historically high rate of foreclosure in the United States. 
Of course, any debate regarding housing must begin by framing the context of the 
discussion, because housing has a number of different definitions.  Depending upon the 
perspective of the individual, ‘housing’ could connote any number of concepts including 
shelter, a place of security, a symbol of wealth, a vehicle for savings, or a mechanism for 
aggregating tax deductions.  In the modern global financial markets, ‘housing’ is the building 
block of a particular asset class: the mortgage-backed security.  However, for most Americans 
‘housing’ is simply the building block of community, a place where we live and call “home.” 
Many economists, politicians, and much of the public believe the recession of 2007-
2009 was caused in large part by a housing crisis.  There are several reasons for this conclusion.  
First, the precipitous decline in U.S. home sales created a bust in the housing market in the year 
prior to the recession.  Second, before and during the recession an abnormally high proportion 
of Americans defaulted on their mortgage payments.   
This default rate had many ripple impacts including unexpected losses in the asset-
backed securities market.  Some academics and political leaders believe that the shock to the 
asset-backed securities market yielded panic in other areas of finance, which slowed the rate of 
lending, and lowered the rate of capital investment.  The slowing economy created a negative 
feedback loop by increasing unemployment, which amplified the number of people who were 
unable to pay their mortgage.  Eventually, the theory portends, this cycle sent the economy 
into a crippling recession as production declined. 
More accurately, the bubble and subsequent “pop” in the housing market was merely 
one symptom of a larger pricing error for the cost to borrow United States dollars.  As I’ll 
explain further, financial innovation and domestic monetary policy led to inflated asset prices in 
a number of sectors, and an imbalance of credit in the national economy.  However, whether or 
not the housing crisis is at fault for the recession, it’s clear that an increase in defaulting 
mortgage payments certainly played a role in the larger economic slowdown.   
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This chapter focuses on the fallout of the housing crisis, and policy implications of that 
new reality.  First, I will define the aspects of housing that are in crisis, with an examination of 
how the crises occurred and why the multiple issues are often combined into one term: 
‘housing crisis.’  Next, I’ll briefly explore the various responses that have been proposed by 
federal and state officials, as well as private institutions, in reaction to those crises.   
 
Defining Crisis 
Upon closer inspection, housing in the United States is in jeopardy from both a 
macroeconomic and microeconomic perspective.  The particular crises facing individual 
households must be separately identified from those facing the larger economy.  However, the 
macro and micro are intertwined.  The widespread economic threats our political leaders must 
resolve result from the aggregation of individual stresses placed on so many homeowners 
across the country.   
Home Economics – Microeconomics of Foreclosure 
At the most basic level, having a home means access to shelter from the rain and cold.  
Few people would argue that today’s homes are less capable of sheltering citizens from the 
elements.  The current crisis does not involve this basic human need.  Having a home also 
means having security and stability; a place where a person feels safe and can retreat to rest, 
relax, or explore personal interests.  There are certainly a small percentage of homes that are 
not safe for particular residents, but on the whole homes still operate as secure environments.  
However, the stability of our nation’s home life is under duress.   
Stability in housing is important for the physical and psychological health of individuals, 
especially children, since homes provide both a space to live and a spatial anchor in the context 
of a larger community.3  Many housing advocates argue that homes are the building blocks of 
community because they provide personal definition and stability.  Those advocates argue that 
citizens will seek to reinforce the security of their surroundings while acting to maximize their 
ability to pursue personal interests.  That concept is not as esoteric as it may sound; people 
intrinsically seek connection with their neighbors, and those social interactions reflect the 
common desires and interests of the community members.  People seek out existing stable 
communities that reflect their values, or attempt to construct new, stable, self-reflective 
communities where they intend to live.  A crisis in housing stability, therefore, would impact 
both the individuals who are uprooted, but also the communities that lose active participants. 
The factors of housing I’ve discussed thus far pertain to both renters and owners.  There 
are additional factors of housing that pertain specifically to owners alone.  For several 
generations, Americans have placed societal value in homeownership.  The arguments for 
owning a home include the factors above – a higher level of security and increased stability.4  
According to the popular logic, ownership has higher entry and exit costs than renting while 
providing owners with more social cache than renters.5  Therefore, owning a home makes 
people more geographically stable and more likely to reinvest their time and money into 
maintaining the quality of the physical neighborhood and social community.   
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More commonly, the pro-ownership rhetoric focuses on the perceived economic 
benefits of buying instead of renting.  First, the United States incentivizes leveraged ownership 
through the tax code.  Owners who borrow money to buy a home may deduct a portion of their 
mortgage interest from their taxable income.  
This leverage incentive theoretically lowers 
the income level required to purchase a 
home.   
Second, since the 1950s, owning a 
home has been considered a safe method for 
investing savings.  There are several facts 
and assumptions underlying this perception.  
First, the tangibility of land and the home 
itself, as well as the fixed-location nature of 
property historically correlated to stable 
home values relative to other asset classes.  
Second, for many decades real estate 
appreciated in value at a steady rate of 
return with very little negative growth.  Combining the positive social implications of 
homeownership with a comparably turnkey and reliable savings vehicle made homeownership 
among the most popular methods of saving and investing in the United States.  The net worth 
of the average American family has been tightly linked to the equity in their home.   
Today, academics still argue that for much of the socioeconomic spectrum, 
homeownership is a dependable and preferable method of wealth creation.6  However, real 
estate can fluctuate in price like any other asset.  If a home loses value or fails to significantly 
increase in value, then the sale of that home will not result in much gain for the owner.  For 
decades, housing was a popular investment mechanism because people considered the 
possibility of loss to be negligible.  American citizens’ savings were tied indelibly to the values of 
American homes, which is why the core of the housing crisis can be defined as a crisis of pricing.   
Expanding on the statement above, foreclosures in a submarket depress pricing because 
foreclosed and bank-owned properties tend to sell at distressed rates.  If enough foreclosures 
are brought to market, supply and demand dynamics force non-distressed homeowners to 
respond with competitive pricing.  The high rate of foreclosure in the United States has a direct, 
negative impact on the net worth of American families. 
A Flat World with Volatile Returns – Macroeconomics of Foreclosure 
Individual foreclosures, as an aggregate, also have large negative macroeconomic 
impacts because residential mortgage debt plays a large role in the global financial markets.   In 
the mid-2000’s construction directly accounted for almost 5% of U.S. gross domestic product.  
Yet, while residential construction has long been a staple of domestic production and a 
bellwether for economic health, in recent years housing has become an increasingly important 
component of liquidity in the global financial markets.  The advent of the mortgage-backed 
security created an entirely new way for people to invest in the American economy.  Mortgage-
backed securities, while extraordinarily complex in reality, are very simple in theory: an investor 
buys the rights to the future cash flows from a mortgage debt. 
 
Figure 2.1 – United States Home Price Index 
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Generally, investors mitigate some of the risks associated with this transaction by 
pooling mortgages together and pooling investment dollars together so that multiple investors 
take a small portion of the cash flow from many different mortgage payments.  This new 
system of investment in consumer debt was both efficient and revolutionary.  Prior to the 
widespread use of mortgage-backed securities, banks that originated mortgages had very few 
options for transferring the risks of owning that debt.  They could either hold the debt, 
collecting payments over a long period of time, or they could sell the mortgage contract to a 
government-sponsored enterprise that would collect the mortgage payments in their stead.   
Selling the contract required the bank to slightly discount the contract’s value, but 
allowed the bank to recoup their cash quickly.  Banks generally prefer to sell a mortgage 
contract, thus opting for cash-in-hand instead of retaining the risk that interest rates would 
fluctuate, or that the borrower eventually would refuse or be unable to repay their contract.  
Historically, banks found very few potential buyers for mortgage contracts, and therefore the 
banks were not always able to off-load this risk or recoup their money faster than the borrower 
repaid them. 
The mortgage-backed security changed the paradigm for mortgage lending.  This new 
asset class allowed the government-sponsored enterprises to repackage and sell the contracts 
they had bought, offloading the risks of interest rates and non-payment again.  Now two 
transactions removed from the borrower, private investors were the new owners of the 
mortgage contracts and the accompanying cash flows.  This process provided the government-
sponsored enterprises quick cash to buy additional mortgages.  Creating ease of sale for 
mortgages meant that banks and other entities could originate more loans without the risk that 
they would have to keep some of those debt contracts on their books.   
Mortgage-backed securities were marketed similarly to bonds, generating predictable 
cash flows for a set period of time, but supposedly at a more advantageous risk/return ratio.  
Among the most ravenous consumers of these new securities were pension funds, foreign 
governments, and investment banks engaging in proprietary trading.  These investors perceived 
that American homeowners were trustworthy borrowers, and very likely to pay their monthly 
mortgage debt.  Therefore buying 
the rights to these cash flows 
appeared to be a low-risk 
investment with relatively high 
rates of return. Underlying this 
entire consumer debt market was 
an ill-conceived assumption: the 
rate of foreclosures in the United 
States would remain low and 
relatively constant.  Any rise in 
foreclosures would inevitably 
disrupt this system, with 
disastrous financial effects.  The 
final component of the American 
housing crisis is widespread 
mortgage default, commonly 
 
Figure 2.2 New Paradigm of Mortgage Debt to Value Ratio 
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called the “foreclosure crisis.” 
In summary, the housing crisis was not one dilemma, but many issues that ranged in 
scope and geography from the unsold residential lots of southern California to New York where 
well-established stalwarts of high finance faltered and failed.  The severe drop in home prices, 
combined with the high real estate transaction volume at bubble pricing and equity extraction 
through HELOCs leaves our country with a dearth of savings.7  Foreclosures are endogenous to 
this economic descent “from Main Street to Wall Street.”  Family and community stability were 
marred when foreclosures spiked, as people have been forced to leave their neighborhoods 
and change their quality of life.  The social fabric of many communities has been ripped apart 
by a new cycle of poverty, crime, and blight.  Rectifying the foreclosure crisis, then, has merit as 
a social and community mission, but it is also an important component of renewed 
macroeconomic stability. 
 
Mitigation Strategies 
According to mortgage industry data from the housing advocacy consortium HOPE NOW 
Alliance, there have been almost 13 million mortgage default solutions initiated in the United 
States since July 2007.  Even with that volume of attempts to slow homeownership loss, the 
problem continues to bloom.  HOPE NOW reports that, on average, there were over 200,000 
new foreclosure starts each month in 2010, and as of February 2011 roughly 2.7 million 
residential borrowers were 60+ days delinquent.8  The social, educational, and health 
ramifications of a transient, underemployed, underhoused citizenry will be felt for decades to 
come.  This situation is politically untenable, and there have already been many efforts made by 
the federal government, state governments, local governments, and the private sector to 
correct housing problems.  One set of initiatives has sought to stabilize supply. 
By far, the hardest subset of delinquent borrowers to help is the “underwater” 
homeowner.  Many industry leaders agree that people who have mortgages significantly larger 
than their home values are hard to support because most outcomes create a loss for both the 
borrower and the lender.  Programs targeting underwater borrowers help them sell their 
homes and rid themselves of the real estate asset.  The most important of these programs is 
the Foreclosure Alternatives Program, which offers incentives for owners to complete a short-
sale or deed-in-lieu transaction for their property, allowing an owner to get out from 
underneath a burdensome mortgage with minimal damage to their credit report.  It 
simultaneously revalues the asset and decreases the debt owed on the property.  However, this 
solution only targets distressed homeowners whose bank notes have a far higher face value 
than the underlying real estate asset, which is not representative of all delinquent borrowers. 
Different programs are needed for the larger distressed population that may still have 
net zero or positive equity, but cannot afford their monthly payments.  For this population, 
policy frameworks attempt to reduce foreclosures by helping homeowners build the financial 
skills necessary to pay their homeownership-related costs while simultaneously lowering the 
dollar value of homeowners’ monthly payments.  The Obama Administration launched multiple 
initiatives simultaneously to achieve those goals, including the National Foreclosure Mitigation 
Counseling Program and the Making Home Affordable Program.   
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The National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program was an expansion and 
restructuring of the existing NeighborWorks homeownership counseling network.  The 
intention of the program was to provide assistance for homeowners at risk of foreclosure, 
many of whom required help contacting their mortgage servicer and navigating mortgage 
modification resources.  Many of the counseling services discussed later in this paper are part 
of this program, or variants of those services. 
Making Home Affordable is the umbrella policy vehicle for a series of interventions 
designed to help individuals refinance or modify existing loans.  The most commonly known of 
these interventions is the Home Affordable Modification Program, or HAMP, which was 
designed to alter mortgage payments.  Other initiatives targeted second liens, targeted 
mortgages that were current but at risk for future default, and the principal reduction program 
for underwater mortgages.  Overall, the Making Home Affordable programs were designed to 
incentivize servicers into modifying loans, typically through a modest reduction in interest rates 
and either forbearance of principal or an extension of the loan term.  While trial modifications 
are occurring, the volume of modifications is dwarfed by growth in delinquencies.9   
Critics of the Making Home Affordable argue that none of these strategies actually help 
a homeowner recover from a significant loss of value because those values will not rebound 
enough to create a satisfactory equity cushion.  Instead these programs only help the banks 
recover or maintain their income stream, because the consumer is paying interest against a 
note while the underlying asset has very low potential to appreciate substantially.  In response 
to this problem, the Obama administration recently announced the Principal Reduction 
Alternative, which gives servicers an incentive to modify the principal on a mortgage contract.10  
Servicers have not reacted to the incentive thus far, and very few such modifications have 
occurred.  Yet, this program is proof that policy makers understand the need for such action.   
Some economists argue for a broader application of this mortgage manipulation 
philosophy, calling for the systematic refinancing of loans.  This action could take many forms, 
but the most common is known as a “cram down”.  Proponents of cram downs argue that 
Obama’s current systems have failed to modify a significant number of mortgages, and that 
private attempts to refinance and modify loans have been equally lackluster.  Cram down 
enthusiasts argue that wholesale modifications would stop the levy breach of foreclosures, 
eventually buttressing the value of the mortgage-backed securities that are weighing down the 
financial sector.  Conversely, opponents argue that manipulation of mortgages without the 
consent of both parties is a violation of contract and thus exposed to lawsuits.  In a similarly 
drastic approach to the supply control, some communities are hoping to raise home values by 
demolishing blighted properties.11  Clearing blight and lowering the total number of available 
units raises surrounding land values through improved aesthetics and decreased competition. 
Overall, there is a plethora of potential solutions, and the right policy framework 
probably incorporates many of them.  In fact, the utilization of many federal programs is 
already intertwined.  For example, many homeowners who attempt to use HAMP or HARP are 
encouraged by HUD and their servicer to contact a NeighborWorks approved counseling agency 
for education and advice before initiating a modification request.  This study will now turn to 
analyzing the role of foreclosure counseling as a potentially vital component of anti-foreclosure 
strategies. 
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CHAPTER 3: RETROFITTING COUNSELING TO 
TREAT FORECLOSURES 
Historically, financial counseling and education has been applied across the country as a 
methodology to assist potential homebuyers.  Most homebuyers sought out the counseling 
services for financial assistance and information on the home buying process.   The National 
Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program and other systematic attempts to educate and 
assist homeowners at risk for foreclosure utilize this well-established counseling network and 
program structure.  It’s often the case that distressed borrowers are interacting with the same 
housing counselors originally focused on helping LMI borrowers buy a home, but who are now 
focused on helping owners through a workout process.27  This chapter explains the current 
counseling model and highlights existing research into the benefits of that system.  The 
following chapters analyze how a variation of that basic counseling process increases the 
positive effects of foreclosure counseling. 
Counseling History and Structure 
As discussed above, there is a well established history in the United States of supporting 
homeownership for both social and economic reasons.  The federal government has directly 
supported homeownership among LMI borrowers through several initiatives including the 
Community Reinvestment Act revision of 1989, policies by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the 
1990s, and the Congressionally-chartered non-profit called Neighborworks.  All these initiatives 
have utilized federal dollars combined with other sources like private grants or revolving loan 
funds to finance homeownership subsidies and promotion programs for Americans.  The most 
common vehicle for these programs is the NeighborWorks grantee nonprofit, a non-taxable 
organization anchored by the mission to expand access to homeownership among LMI and 
minority populations.   
The current demographics of counseling consumers suggest that these nonprofits are 
effective at reaching their target markets.  According to a Department of Housing and Urban 
Development Report report in 2008, half of counseling consumers have incomes below 50% of 
their local area median income while another 30% of consumers live between 50% and 80% of 
AMI.  Minority populations are also a key target group for these policies and the same report 
showed that half of counseling services go to non-white consumers.  African Americans account 
for 35% of HUD-sponsored counseling activity, which is almost three times higher than their 
representative proportion for United States’ population.12   
Regardless of the funding source or the target market, the primary strategy for 
expanding homeownership among LMI populations was homeownership counseling and 
financial education services provided by these nonprofit agencies.  While there are alternative 
structures or delivery methods, most counseling and financial education models have a similar 
structure.   
First, the potential client goes through an intake and screening process to determine 
their current fitness and future potential to own a home.  This process sorts potential buyers 
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into categories, with ready-to-buy clients getting fast tracked, most clients receiving the 
standard course of treatment, and non-creditworthy clients receiving additional education 
services or a recommendation to continue as a renter.  Most clients move on to group 
education where they learn basic financial principals and the home buying process.  
Simultaneously, they receive individualized counseling to set personal goals and write a budget.  
Many programs have this counselor continue advising the client as the buyer creates a team of 
service providers, including the mortgage broker and realtor.  The counselor may also shepherd 
the client through purchase assistance programs.  Until very recently, almost all counseling 
programs had little or zero contact with buyers after closing.  Previous research at the Center 
for Community Capital has broken down the benefits of this process along a time continuum, 
and I will use that continuum to define the process in more detail.13   
Counseling Creates Better Homebuyers 
The first benefit to buyers is preparation for homeownership, which generally includes 
group education on basic financial knowledge and individual counseling regarding purchase 
readiness.  In a 2008 report titled, “The State of the Housing Counseling Industry: 2008 Report”, 
Herbert et al wrote that of the 300,000 people who received homeownership counseling in the 
United States in 2007, those people spent almost eight hours with a counselor on average.23  
There is a significant sorting impact of this process, as some potential buyers realize they are 
not fit for ownership at all.   
Others slow the buying process to focus on making themselves a more sustainable 
candidate by paying down consumer credit or saving more for a larger down payment.  In 2007, 
Hangen and Lubell noted that counseling agencies are effective at getting potential 
homebuyers to appreciably lower their credit score, which translates to better loan terms.14 
Second, mission-based nonprofits help potential homebuyers find advantageous 
financing.  Financing knowledge comes through education about the lending process and how 
to compare the terms of different loans.  In 2008, Pittman wrote about the impacts of an 
individual borrower consulting different sources before entering into a loan agreement.  This 
study showed that some degree of consultation increases the rate of preferable terms, but that 
consulting a counselor or financial professional achieved better terms than consulting friends or 
family.15   
Counselors also help LMI borrowers by connecting them with local, state, and federal 
resources and programs that provide financing subsidies.  A Saegart et al study in 200516 and 
Smith’s study in 200913 both looked at Neighborworks data on counseling participants, 
concluding that counseled LMI borrowers were likely to have a lower mortgage rate and fixed 
loan terms compared to other LMI borrowers. 
Third, after purchase, many homeowners exhibit better understanding of the impact of 
their financial health on their livelihood.  Exposure to topics like budgeting and the need for 
savings to self-insure against maintenance events make counseled homebuyers better prepared 
on average for the rigors of homeownership than other LMI borrowers.  Generally, these 
principles get applied in other aspects of financial life as well.  In 2006 Bahchieva noted that 
counseled homeowners in New York were more likely to be satisfied with their homeownership 
experience, spend money more efficiently on home repairs, and pay their mortgage more 
regularly.17  In 2008, Spader and Quercia found that counseling increased the likelihood of 
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homeowners making strategic financial decisions, including prepaying their mortgage when 
that was an advantageous action.18 
Counseling Helps Prevent Mortgage Default 
Finally, the result of this sorting and education process probably results in a more stable 
ownership environment, with lower default rates.  Borrowers who utilize counseling and 
education services tend to become more stable borrowers by understanding risks, but they also 
increase the selectivity of their loan product selection, which is a key driver of defaults.  In 
2001, Hirad and Zorn used data from Freddie Mac on 40,000 mortgages, ascertaining that 
certain types of counseling correlated to significant declines in default rate.  Home study, 
classroom education, and one-one-one counseling correlated to declines of 21%, 26%, and 34% 
respectively while telephone interactions had no determinable impact. 19   
Hirad and Zorn also noted that there was no way to determine whether the impact was 
a result of the counseling, or some other endogenous variable like the selection bias of the 
counseling consumer.  Experimental design calls into question whether people who would 
choose to complete counseling and education programs are systematically different 
homeowners with relation to debt repayment from buyers who would not consider such 
treatments.  This endogeneity bias plagues all research on the topic, as far as I know, and some 
authors including Agarwal in 2009 have written that selection bias in specific instances can 
explain most of the decrease in defaults.20 
However, several other studies have come forth to reinforce the claim that there is a 
statistically significant correlation between counseling and lowered default rates.  In 2002, 
Hartarski et al found that homeowners who used a particular counseling program that focused 
on budgeting and cash flow analysis were half as likely to default as owners who did not get the 
programmed education.21  Hermanson and Wilden probed this topic in 2003, suggesting that 
lowering the risk of default makes Community Reinvestment Act-related lending more 
palatable to banks.22  Herbert et al said that while there was no conclusive evidence at the time 
to suggest counseling lowers the likelihood of default, counseled borrowers are less likely to 
take out riskier adjustable rate mortgages.23   
In 2008 and 2009, several studies at the Center for Community Capital and the Urban 
Institute provided evidence that this correlation actually has a causal relationship.  Ding et al at 
the Center for Community Capital wrote in 2008 that cerebus parabis, LMI borrowers who 
borrowed using ARMs were three to five times more likely to default than borrowers in a 30-
year fixed mortgage.24  As described above, previous studies have shown that counseling 
improves the likelihood that borrowers will choose a less-risky mortgage product, generally 
defined as a fixed rate product.  Operating under the common belief that under normal 
conditions adjustable rate mortgages are more likely to default than fixed rate mortgages, then 
the logical conclusion is that counseling helps prevent defaults.   
A second 2008 study at the Center for Community Capital, “The Impacts of Community-
based Foreclosure Prevention Programs” by Quercia and Cowan, studied over 4,000 borrowers 
who utilized assistance through the Minnesota Foreclosure Prevention Program.  The study 
population consisted of current homeowners who utilized counseling and financial education 
services similar to prepurchase borrowers.  The authors found that among homeowners in the 
foreclosure prevention program who had already defaulted, a homeowner who had previous 
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experience with financial education was 32% less likely to default again after utilizing the 
foreclosure prevention program.   More importantly, among borrowers at risk but not in 
default, those who had also received prepurchase counseling were 97% more likely to avoid 
default after the foreclosure prevention program, compared to people who only utilized 
foreclosure assistance.25   
In 2009, the Urban Institute released their preliminary findings after studying the 
impacts of the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program.    In that report, Mayer et 
al found that foreclosure counseling efforts had a positive effect on homeowners’ ability to stay 
out of foreclosure, to salvage their home in the event of a foreclosure, and to remain current 
on their mortgage payments after receiving a modification.26  In December of 2010, the same 
research team published additional analysis, this time reporting that the counseling services 
were particularly effective at helping homeowners get more sustainable modifications and 
avoid redefault.  They cited that foreclosure counselors were more adept at the modification 
process, but also that counseling recipients were more likely to have stronger financial 
management skills because of their participation in education programs.27 
In conclusion, studies show a range of potential benefits to low and moderate income 
real estate consumers from counseling, depending on the quality and delivery method.  Those 
benefits include:  
  
1. Sorting of the LMI population for buyers “most fit” for ownership13 14 16 
2. Lower consumption of high-cost mortgages13 14 15 16 
3. Higher satisfaction with housing payments17 
4. Improved financial wherewithal and knowledge13 14 18 19 
5. Increased likelihood to seek foreclosure prevention assistance25 
6. Increased likelihood of subsequent refinancing to a lower cost mortgage.18 
7. Correlation to reduced delinquency and default19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
 
Most importantly for the purposes of this analysis, the literature shows that there are 
links between prepurchase counseling methodologies and foreclosure prevention.  Foreclosure 
prevention program design mirrors prepurchase counseling and education because the 
targeted knowledge and skills are the same.  Obviously, it is preferable that LMI homeowners 
have those skills early in the buying cycle.  However, as Herbert noted, during the rapid 
ownership expansion period of the mid 2000s, many LMI borrowers took out loans without any 
form of counseling or education.23  Therefore, there is a large population of LMI borrowers at 
risk for foreclosure who may benefit from the skills and knowledge provided by these existing 
programs.   In a time of rising foreclosures in America, especially among LMI borrowers, 
retrofitting prepurchase programs to help mitigate foreclosure risk seems like a strong method 
to help slow home loss and stabilize housing markets.  The next step is to understand what 
aspects of the counseling program are most important to foreclosure clients’ home retention.  
Are there particular program designs that increase the likelihood of home retention?  
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CHAPTER 4: A CASE STUDY IN FORECLOSURE 
COUNSELING 
Variations of the counseling method described above have cropped up across the 
country as different groups attempt to refine services that reduce the likelihood of home loss.  
The volume and variety of these modifications make it difficult for economic development 
professionals, planners, and policy makers to identify if any of these models create marginal 
benefits beyond the standard counseling strategy.   
One promising variation calls for additional education and counseling related to 
spending behaviors.  In interviews for this research, housing counselors identified that while 
some borrowers understand budgeting techniques and have basic financial literacy, their 
money-related behaviors do not reflect that knowledge.  Those counselors believe bad 
spending behavior is related to some mortgage delinquencies, and also correlates to default 
recidivism among borrowers with modifications.   
The remainder of this study analyzes one organization’s program that added spending 
behavior interventions to their foreclosure counseling regimen.  HomeFree-USA’s Project 
Restore program assumes that better spending habits would help counseled borrowers avoid 
mortgage default in the future.  If the program is successful, this method of behavior 
modification may have value as a replicable practice that can further reduce foreclosures 
among counseled at-risk borrowers. 
HomeFree-USA – Changing Priorities During the Financial Crisis 
HomeFree-USA, based out of Maryland, is a NeighborWorks grantee non-profit 
organization devoted to marketing the benefits of homeownership.  In their own words, 
“HomeFree-USA increases the homeownership success and financial skills and capabilities of 
working class families by providing information, inspiration and motivation, thereby placing 
them on the road to financial self-sufficiency and building wealth.”  Like many NeighborWorks 
grantees, HomeFree widened their national focus from homebuyer development programs 
toward foreclosure prevention as the financial crises evolved.  At their core, the skills 
developed in both programs are identical: financial education, credit education, savings 
enhancement, and debt reduction.  The differences between the two processes stemmed from 
the counseling needs of the clients and the need for immediate behavioral change on the part 
of the client in order to achieve financial solvency. 
The foreclosure crisis meant a temporary change in the organization’s goals and primary 
focus from homebuyer development to foreclosure prevention.  HomeFree titled this new 
initiative Homeownership Helps, and developed several programs targeting home retention.  
First, HomeFree produced a marketing and education video called Foreclosure Prevention, 
which aired on public access in the DC area.  The video talks about some of the key components 
of retention and explains the services HomeFree can provide at no cost to the homeowner.  
Second, they introduced a financial literacy course entitled Financial Mistakes to Avoid, which 
was presented to small groups of homebuyers, homeowners, and corporate employees during 
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brown bag luncheons.  The course included skills that are relevant to potential homeowners 
and existing owners in danger of delinquency.  
All people who come to HomeFree for foreclosure mitigation assistance go through a 
program similar to the prepurchase counseling model.  First, the program intakes at-risk or 
delinquent owners, providing them with group education courses including Financial Mistakes 
to Avoid, and also providing a housing counselor who acts as their modification specialist.  
Currently, 70% of the owners who contact HomeFree are able to get some sort of modification 
and maintain their home.   For those cases where foreclosure is inevitable, HomeFree measures 
success based on their ability to help the client achieve a “graceful exit” by providing 
connections to other community outreach programs that handle post-foreclosure cases.  
Overall, the Homeownership Helps program has enrolled over 10,000 people nationally and 
helped achieve workouts for 80% of those who complete the program.   
Project Restore – Innovative Approach to Foreclosure Mitigation 
HomeFree’s Project Restore is another pilot program within the Homeownership Helps 
initiative.  Project Restore offers a method to help homeowners change their spending 
behaviors in order to succeed at homeownership after a modification to their existing 
mortgage.  This program targets homeowners who are eligible for a sustainable mortgage 
modification outcome and provides those borrowers with financial literacy education to 
prevent default, redefault, or foreclosure.   
Where Project Restore participants depart in their treatment from other HomeFree 
foreclosure assistance clients is the additional services provided: additional time in one-on-one 
counseling and “behavior modification” workshops that target advanced budgeting and savings 
skills.  HomeFree describes their Project Restore program as a three-pronged attack on 
homeownership default through financial education classes, one-on-one financial development 
coaching, and behavior modification workshops.   
Project Restore participants receive additional time with a counselor called a “financial 
coach,” who helps households redesign their budget and spending behaviors.  The coach tracks 
metrics like savings, debt, debt to income ratios, and credit scores to help owners understand 
1) what are the everyday decisions they make that impact those metrics and 2) how those 
metrics impact their ability to maintain their home.  The coaches ask provocative questions that 
help people think about their spending habits and build strategies with owners to change their 
spending behaviors.  
 The participants also spend time in behavior modification classes where they receive 
several hours of training on advanced budgeting strategies and savings goal creation.  
HomeFree describes the one-on-one program as “…a financial development coach who 
provides…financial coaching and guides the homeowner through the year-long program.”  The 
mentor/mentee model attempts to generate a feeling of accountability on the part of the 
homeowner for their financial decisions.  Simultaneously, the behavior modification workshops 
seek to educate homeowners about the risks of unnecessary spending.  HomeFree described 
the model structure, writing,  
 
“During the first meeting with the coach, the homeowner’s financial status and 
unique situation are assessed, and arrangements are made for enrolling the 
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homeowner in direct deposit and automatic bill pay for their mortgage (which is 
mandatory) and other bills as appropriate. The financial assessment includes 
income, credit, debt, savings, and debt to income ratios. A preliminary budget is 
given to the homeowner and the next meeting is scheduled for about two weeks 
later. 
 
During the next meeting the homeowner and financial development coach work 
together to develop a Financial Reconditioning Achievement Plan. This is the 
homeowner’s roadmap to increasing their credit score, decreasing debt, 
increasing savings and bringing their debt-to-income ratios in line. In addition, at 
this meeting the homeowner is introduced to the financial education and 
behavior modification components of the program. 
 
A follow-up meeting is scheduled about 45 days later to review how the 
homeowner is doing with their budget.  Additional meetings are then scheduled 
about every 60 days (depending on the need of the homeowner) to review the 
client’s progress in paying the mortgage on time, staying within budget, 
reducing debt and increasing savings.  The financial development coach meets 
with the homeowner as frequently as necessary… 
 
The behavior modification component ensures on-going success. This is where 
the homeowner puts into practice all they have learned…for lifelong financial 
self-sufficiency. Under the direction of a professional facilitator, participants 
assess their spending habits and money management skills while they make the 
necessary behavior changes in their lives for sustaining their improved financial 
condition and managing ongoing and future debt.” 
  
The program’s innovation is not just modifying the loan, but also modifying the behavior 
of the homeowner.  HomeFree’s Project Restore offers a method for efficiently helping 
homeowners achieve modifications to their existing mortgages.  Project Restore also targets 
homeowners who have already modified their mortgage for additional financial literacy 
education to prevent redefault.  Our research now focuses on utilizing data to assess whether 
this one-on-one counseling model, with the behavior modification component, helps prevent 
home loss among at-risk homeowners. 
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CHAPTER 5: PROJECT RESTORE INCREASES HOME 
RETENTION 
The dataset provided by HomeFree for this analysis included all the foreclosure 
counseling clients serviced by HomeFree between July 2009 and December 2010.  A small 
proportion of those clients were given the experimental Project Restore counseling, while the 
vast majority of the approximately 5,500 clients went through the traditional counseling 
process.  For further information on the demographic, economic, and borrowing characteristics 
of the clients in the dataset, please refer to Appendix 2.  In order to accurately measure the 
impact of the Project Restore counseling treatment, I used a statistical methodology called 
“greedy matching” to create a small control group of traditional counseling clients that were 
very similar in their observable characteristics to the Project Restore participants.  For further 
details on the greedy matching methodology and final outcome of the control group matching 
process, please refer to Appendix 3. 
Once I had a control sample of nonparticipants that accurately reflected the same 
observable characteristics as Project Restore clients, I compared the home retention outcomes 
of each sample.  In order to test that comparison, I collected data on whether or not the clients 
were still living in the residence they reported as their home during HomeFree intake.  By 
comparing the residency status of each sample, I was able to determine whether or not 
behavior counseling was correlated to clients remaining in their homes after foreclosure 
counseling treatment. 
Behavior Modification and Mortgage Modification Effect Home Retention 
Overall, I cross-referenced 144 clients against their last known address, yielding 137 
residency confirmations and seven lost homes.  Six of the lost homes were from the matched 
control group, representing 91.6% home retention, while one Project Restore participant lost a 
home, representing 98.6% home retention.  The spread between the two rates suggests that 
there’s an increased likelihood of home retention among eligible clients if they participate in 
the Project Restore program.   
Statistical analysis supports this claim.  Utilizing a logit regression to test home retention 
as the dependent variable against the Project Restore treatment as the independent variable, 
the treatment is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, even after controlling for 
other important predictors.  While the sample sizes are relatively small, I can conclude that for 
clients who fit the profile of a program participant, using Project Restore makes the client more 
likely to maintain their home. 
Additionally, while Project Restore participation was a statistically significant factor in 
home retention, there was a more significant explanatory variable across the two matched 
samples.  The reported “counseling outcome”, more accurately described as their “mortgage 
modification outcome”, was highly statistically significant.  This suggests that obtaining a 
modification or forbearance from a loan servicer is just as indicative of home retention as 
counseling services.  This finding supports the Urban Institute study that showed counseling 
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positively impacts the quality of a borrower’s modification, and their ability to maintain 
homeownership after that mortgage modification.27   
I believe the modification outcomes are collinear with several important factors that 
were impossible to control in this analysis, including submarket dynamics, the equity position of 
the owner, and the willingness of banks to underwrite the borrower in a modification.  The 
modification outcome variable seems to account for a client’s structural ability or inability to 
regain control of their financial situation after becoming at-risk for default.  Regardless, pairing 
the modification outcome variable as a covariate of Project Restore participation against 
ownership outcome creates a strong model for estimating the likelihood of home retention.   
The findings suggest that the behavior modification counseling has a positive effect on 
homeownership.  When coupled with a sustainable mortgage modification, there is a very high 
likelihood that a counseled borrower who receives this behavior modification treatment will be 
able to maintain their home.  This methodology is worth considering in other home retention 
efforts and warrants further examination in future work. 
Further examination is necessary because there are still unanswered questions.  First, 
the small sample sizes make any analysis very sensitive to several types of sorting and reporting 
bias, which are discussed in detail in the appendixes.  A replication of this methodology using a 
larger dataset, potentially the entire national pilot program dataset, would help reinforce these 
findings.  
Another consideration that potentially impacts the ownership outcome is the 
geographic proximity to other HomeFree clients, specifically other Project Restore participants.  
The low number of experimental observations prevents a rigorous spatial analysis, but the heat 
maps in Figure 5.1 displays a clear clustering effect of Project Restore participants.  If a the 
geospatial clustering of participants does have a positive impact on home retention outcomes, 
then assuming the programs have a limited capacity, the treatment selection should consider a 
client’s proximity to others who are participating in the program.  With a larger data set, this 
analysis could easily include a geospatial weighting that would control for clustering bias. 
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Implications for Planners 
While almost 13 million homeowners have already been impacted by mortgage default 
in some way, the risk of widespread foreclosure continues.  Credit Suisse’s RMBS Research 
Team reports that more than $25 billion worth of residential mortgages will reset each month 
through July 2012.  Even if the likelihood that an adjustable-rate mortgage defaults dropped 
below pre-2007 historical norms, the volume of rate resets implies that defaults will remain 
numerous for several more years.  The case study of HomeFree’s Project Restore program 
suggests that for a portion of the at-risk homeownership population, behavior modification can 
positively impact their ability to maintain their home.  The evidence presented here suggests 
that savings behavior counseling, as an add-on to the traditional foreclosure counseling 
treatment, can help delinquent and at-risk homeowners stay in their home and service their 
debt obligations.   
Additionally, sustainable mortgages, generally achieved through modification, are a key 
indicator of whether an LMI borrower will be able to remain in their home.  There are many 
variables influencing whether a particular homeowner and their servicer can agree to a 
Figure 5.1 Density Heat Map of Project Restore Participants 
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modification, but identifying the profile of borrowers who will get a modification can help 
economic development groups analyze the potential for recidivism and future foreclosure rates 
in a particular community. 
The behavior modification program can certainly be scaled within HomeFree’s national 
network of offices, but I believe it can also be replicated and scaled through other 
Neighborworks affiliates.  Scaling this program certainly requires a counseling program of 
significant size, and the organization must have relatively advanced data reporting techniques 
in place to track performance.  However, there are a number of other counseling agencies 
across the nation with similar access to resources that could implement this effective program. 
Furthermore, homeownership retention rates among HomeFree clients were 
significantly higher than the overall retention rate for delinquent homeowners in the 
Washington, DC area and the nation as a whole.i  Therefore, add this analysis to a growing mass 
of literature that supports foreclosure mitigation counseling as an effective component of 
policy solutions to the foreclosure crisis.  While foreclosure counseling cannot mitigate the 
crisis without complementary actions, counseling coupled with spending behavior modification 
should be considered key components of any comprehensive foreclosure mitigation strategy. 
 
 
                                                     
i
 Home retention rates based on data published by www.realtytrac.com 
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APPENDIX 1: ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF 
WIDESPREAD FORECLOSURE 
Equity Explosion – The Boom 
In the early 2000’s, potential homeowners across the United States saw the quickly 
rising value of real estate and perceived that buying a home was an ideal savings vehicle.  In 
fact, many people bought second and third homes as investments because the rate of return 
from real estate in many parts of the country was outstripping standard equity and debt 
markets.  Because of artificially low interest rates and the recent mortgage-backed security 
innovation, there was competition within the loan origination industry that made debt of all 
types historically easy to procure.  Figure A1.1 illustrates how people bought homes at a record 
pace. 
Home sales spiked for existing property, but the new home market was even hotter.  
Homebuilders bought greenfield land and constructed homes at a record pace, still unable to 
keep up with the bubble in demand.  Simultaneously, mortgage originators realized that by 
relaxing due-diligence standards and increasing the availability of alternative loan structures, 
they could sell mortgages to potential consumers in a lower, previously untapped income 
bracket. These new loans were mostly structured as variable rate mortgages with very low 
initial payments that would reset at a higher rate after a few years.  Many consumers were 
authorized to borrow based on their ability to repay the initial monthly payment, not the 
amount of the eventual reset.   
Simultaneously, existing 
homeowners who realized large 
equity gains from the increases in 
their home value chose to extract 
that capital value through lines of 
credit against their equity cushion.  
While the home equity line of 
credit was originally structured to 
help homeowners make capital 
investments in their existing 
home, most Americans used the 
cash to buy consumer products, go 
on vacation, or as leverage for 
additional real estate investment. 
The reasoning for this alternative underwriting structure was simple: with home values 
increasing steadily, the borrower would yield tremendous increases in equity before a reset or 
line of credit term matured.  At the time of reset or maturity, the owner could either sell the 
property for a profit or refinance using the additional equity cushion created from pricing 
growth.  The widespread sale of alternative loans exacerbated the boom in home sales, 
doubling America’s mortgage debt in six years (Figure A1.2).  
Figure A1.1 – United States Annual New Home Sales 
 
Source: www.beyourowneconomist.blogspot.com 
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With home prices rising, new borrowers buying homes at a record pace, and a 
historically high percentage of borrowers paying their mortgage on time, a tidal wave of 
international money flooded the United States economy as investors demanded mortgage-
backed securities.  Demand for mortgage contracts that could be converted into securities 
resembled a feeding frenzy.  Banks and other financial service providers recognized the 
potential for huge profits via mortgage origination.   
These companies made money simply by taking fees when they originated the loan, 
never intending to hold the debt contract for more than a few days.  Having no stake in the 
actual future cash flows from the mortgage payments, these banks and mortgage brokers had 
no motivation to accurately verify whether or not a person would be capable of repaying the 
debt.  Valuing fees rather than the viability of repayment, lender due-diligence became less 
important for many brokers than the volume of mortgage originations.   
If any shock to the system altered the trajectory of price growth back to historical 
norms, a rise in foreclosures was 
inevitable because the post-
adjustment payments on many 
alternative loans were 
unsustainable.  Concisely, 
originators made loans that were 
predestined for default.  
Mortgage-backed securities 
started to include loans that were 
much less likely to be repaid in 
full.  Yet those securities were 
marketed identically to the 
previous generation of securities 
that were far more ethically 
originated and well documented. 
Equity Fallout – The Bust 
When the bubble burst, the first symptom was a slowdown in new home construction.  
The housing construction industry includes development companies, construction companies, 
materials suppliers, and all the services that support those enterprises.  The stall in the 
construction of for-sale and rental housing resulted in hundreds of thousands of jobs lost.  This 
alone could not constitute a crisis, but many today consider this construction bust a death knell.   
Seemingly overnight, the frenzied market for home sales was flush with supply, and the 
prices of homes plummeted. The construction and pricing busts appeared have a ripple impact 
on other industries, and the economy began to contract.  Recession-inducing contraction 
always has many faces, but in this case the rising unemployment rates initially focused in the 
construction sector.  However, businesses in other sectors began experiencing slow sales, 
forecasted lower future revenue, and started shrinking in size.  
Widespread job loss coincided with the first wave of subprime loan resets.  At the 
microeconomic level, individual homeowners began defaulting on mortgage payments because 
they had lost their job, had their hours cut, or been given an involuntary furlough.  In many 
 
Figure A1.2 – Quarterly United States Debt Balance by Category 
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cases, a homeowner may have retained their job, but could not meet the higher monthly 
payment after reset.  The implied double safety net of refinance and resale were underpinned 
by the assumption of rising equity.  However, owners found themselves unable to sell their 
home in the rapidly cooling housing market, and lenders were suddenly wary of writing new 
loans without high equity contribution. With home prices plummeting, many of those who 
were still capable of paying their monthly payment realized that doing so was no longer a 
financially sound decision.  For the first time in history, a significant proportion of Americans 
owed more for their home than the property was worth. 
At the macroeconomic level, the sudden spike in mortgage payment defaults scared 
mortgage-backed securities investors.  Suddenly, the core assumption that these securities 
were a reliable source of income was stripped away.  As the rate of foreclosure increased, 
investors attempted to recoup their losses by selling foreclosed homes at a deep discount.  This 
had the iterative effect of lowering home values further as supply and demand were driven 
further apart.  Finally, investors began to dump the asset-backed securities as well, selling well 
below the initial price, because they realized no one could accurately predict the scale of their 
potential losses.  This landslide in asset-backed securities pricing had a jolting impact on other 
asset classes, and there was a worldwide shock to financial markets. 
The larger financial markets crash culminated with a credit freeze in late 2008, when 
banks became unwilling to lend to consumers, businesses, or one another.  This credit freeze 
had the amplifying impact of halting most capital investment which hastened the contraction of 
domestic production.   Meanwhile, in the financial sector, this credit freeze resulted in the 
failure of many small to medium sized banks in the United States, and sale of several major 
globally active investment banks.  The failures have been directly linked to the dead banks’ 
overexposure in mortgage-backed securities.  Regardless of the definition of “overexposure”, 
investors and lenders lost confidence in the liquidity of those institutions once they disclosed 
how much money they invested in mortgage-backed securities and their derivatives.  Thus, the 
loss of value in American homes and the devaluation of the securities created from those 
mortgages’ cash flows directly contributed to the global recession. 
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APPENDIX 2: DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT RESTORE 
DATA 
This appendix provides detailed descriptions, including statistical investigation, of the 
data provided by HomeFree-USA.  The Project Restore program is a national pilot, but the 
number of regional participants varies widely depending upon the size of each HomeFree 
office.  Comparing the outcomes of Project Restore across multiple geographies presented 
several significant challenges.  First, differences in the structural variables for each regional 
economy and housing market would be very difficult to control quantitatively.  Second, and 
more importantly, the implementation of Project Restore’s key programming – group 
education, one-on-one counseling, and spending behavior seminars – was not consistent across 
each office.  Therefore, I decided to focus the quantitative analysis on clients serviced at 
HomeFree’s national headquarters in Maryland, where the Project Restore program was 
envisioned, and where the majority of Project Restore participants receive counseling.   
HomeFree provided a data set with information on 5,457 homeowners who contacted 
HomeFree’s Maryland office between July 1, 2009 and December 31, 2010 for foreclosure 
mitigation assistance.  Among those 5,457 homeowners were 79 clients who went on to 
participate in the Project Restore program.  The following descriptive information about the 
dataset is separated to examine differences between the Project Restore population and the 
larger “nonparticipant” client population. 
Note that for almost every variable, there were values missing or incorrectly entered 
into the database, so the sample size for a particular variable most likely is not 5,457.  The data 
was cleaned and missing values were not included in the analysis unless I had reason to believe 
there was a systematic reason for clients to withhold information or for counselors to refuse to 
input the information into the database.  I will note cases where I accounted for this systematic 
nondisclosure.   
Demographics 
Splitting the population between standard foreclosure treatment and Project Restore 
treatment, there are many similarities between the two samples, but also some noteworthy 
differences.  Race is broken down into 11 categories, as shown in Figure A2.1.  “Black or African 
American” owners constitute 56% of the untreated population, and 75% of the Project Restore 
population.   
Hollander 28 of 62 
 
 
Age was not originally reported but I calculated an approximate age based on years 
between birth year and 2011.  58 birthdates were reported with years between 2008 and 2010.  
In those cases, the birthdates were treated as “Did not disclose.”  Age among nonparticipants 
ranged from 22 to 92, with a median age of 49, while Project Restore ages ranged from 30 to 
70, with a median age of 52.  Figures A2.2 and A2.3 illustrate the age breakdown for each 
population, both of which approach normal distributions.  Gender was approximately balanced 
in the nonparticipant population, with slightly more male clients.  However, Figure A2.4 shows 
that the Project Restore population had a much larger proportion of females. 
  
 
Figure A2.5 shows a numerical breakdown of the clients by county of residency.  The 
data set included homes in 66 counties, with 14 outlier counties from parts of the country not 
immediately adjacent to the Washington, DC or Baltimore metropolitan statistical areas.  
Clients serviced in these counties predominantly had personal ties with a counselor at 
Figure A2.4 Summary of Gender for HomeFree Data Set 
Gender  
    Non PR PR 
Count of GENDER Count of GENDER % % 
Female 2522 47 48% 59% 
Male 2720 32 52% 41% 
Grand Total 5242 79     
 
Figure A2.3 Age Counts for Project Restore Sample 
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Figure A2.2 Age Counts for Nonparticipants 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
2
0
2
8
3
6
4
4
5
2
6
0
6
8
7
6
8
4
9
2
1
0
0
Figure A2.1 Summary of Race for HomeFree Data Set 
Race 
Non PR PR Non PR PR 
Count of 
RACE 
Count of 
RACE % % 
American Indian or Alaskan Native 16 
 
0.3% 0.0% 
American Indian or Alaskan Native AND Black or African American 13 1 0.2% 1.3% 
American Indian or Alaskan Native AND White 3 
 
0.1% 0.0% 
Asian 182 2 3.5% 2.5% 
Asian AND White 3 
 
0.1% 0.0% 
Black or African American 2949 59 56.3% 74.7% 
Black or African American AND White 29 
 
0.6% 0.0% 
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 3 1 0.1% 1.3% 
Other 1755 15 33.5% 19.0% 
White 283 1 5.4% 1.3% 
Grand Total 5236 79     
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HomeFree, or were cases moved from other HomeFree offices to a counselor located within the 
Maryland office. 
Aside from those outliers, the vast majority of HomeFree foreclosure clients reside in 
the Maryland counties within the Washington DC metro area.  Prince George’s and 
Montgomery counties accounted for 79% of nonparticipants and 87% of Project Restore 
participants.   
 
 
Figures A2.6 and A2.7 are maps displaying the residential locations of HomeFree clients 
within the study area, defined as Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, DC.  Figure A2.6 shows 
the approximate location of each residence that clients reported as an “at-risk” mortgage.  
Figure A2.7 is a density map of HomeFree foreclosure clients, displaying how many clients lived 
within a one-square mile area. 
 
Figure A2.5 Summary of County for HomeFree Data Set 
  Non PR PR Non PR PR 
County Count of COUNTY Count of COUNTY % % 
PRINCE GEORGES 2628 47 48.9% 59.5% 
MONTGOMERY 1551 23 28.9% 29.1% 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 346 5 6.4% 6.3% 
FAIRFAX 128 
 
2.4% 0.0% 
CHARLES 107 
 
2.0% 0.0% 
HOWARD 94 1 1.7% 1.3% 
ANNE ARUNDEL 95 
 
1.8% 0.0% 
FREDERICK 79 1 1.5% 1.3% 
BALTIMORE 55 
 
1.0% 0.0% 
PRINCE WILLIAM 53 
 
1.0% 0.0% 
LOUDOUN 32 
 
0.6% 0.0% 
BALTIMORE CITY 25 
 
0.5% 0.0% 
Other 183 2 3.4% 2.5% 
Grand Total 5376 79 100% 100% 
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Figure A2.6 Point Location Map of Client Mortgages for the Entire HomeFree Data Set 
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HomeFree listed family structure in seven distinct categories, accounting for marriage 
status and presence of dependents.  Single adults accounted for roughly 20% of each 
population.  Nearly half of the nonparticipant population was married with dependents, while 
only 35% of Project Restore participants were married with dependents.  Contrastingly, Project 
Restore participants included a higher percentage of married couples without dependents, and 
female single-parents heads of household.  Figure A2.8 displays a breakdown of family status 
for the data set. 
Figure A2.7 Density Heat Map of Mortgages per Square Mile for HomeFree Data Set 
 
Hollander 32 of 62 
 
 
Financial Health of the Client 
The data set included several variables to provide information on the financial status of 
the household requesting services.  These variables constituted information gleaned from the 
intake interview including income, credit score, and PITI.  PITI is a measure of monthly 
mortgage payment representing the costs of mortgage principle, mortgage interest, property 
taxes, and property insurance.  When viewed as a whole, these metrics provide a snapshot of 
the financial position of the client, including their ability to service their mortgage debt. 
The income variable explains each client’s reported income at the time of intake.  
HomeFree annualized each number to standardize the data.  After reviewing and cleaning the 
data, HomeFree provided revised incomes for three participants, and I threw out two incomes 
that were actually error codes produced by HomeFree’s reporting system.  In this study I 
rounded all incomes to the nearest thousands digit to reflect the lowest level of precision 
among counselors who collected this information. 
Annual incomes for nonparticipants ranged from zero to $597,000, although the 
exceptionally high kurtosis of the distribution suggests there are infrequent, highly extreme 
deviations from the mean.  The median income among nonparticipants was $36,000 and the 
mean was skewed slightly higher at $38,000.  Almost 600 nonparticipants reported incomes of 
zero, representing recent job loss.  Annual incomes for Project Restore participants ranged from 
$12,000 to $149,000 with a median income of $46,000, while the mean was skewed higher at 
$51,000.   
Overall, Project Restore participants had a higher income level than the nonparticipant 
population.  This difference in the distributions potentially reflects a sorting bias for 
homeowners with the financial capacity to maintain some level of debt service moving forward.  
Given the skewness and high kurtosis of the distributions, I cannot be statistically certain that 
there is a difference between the two samples’ distributions.  Figures A2.9 and A2.10 display 
histograms of the income distributions by participation. 
Figure A2.8 Summary of Family Structure for HomeFree Data Set 
        Non PR PR 
Household Type Code 
Count of 
HOUSEHOLDTYPE 
Count of 
HOUSEHOLDTYPE % % 
Single adult 1 999 15 20.3% 19.5% 
Female‐headed single parent 
household 2 769 17 15.6% 22.1% 
Male‐headed single parent 
household 3 184 5 3.7% 6.5% 
Married without dependents 4 334 12 6.8% 15.6% 
Married with dependents 5 2369 27 48.0% 35.1% 
Two or more unrelated adults 6 95 
 
1.9% 0.0% 
Other 7 183 1 3.7% 1.3% 
Grand Total   4933 77     
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Counselors pulled a credit score for all clients who gave HomeFree permission to do so 
at intake.  Credit scores were heavily utilized by counselors both as an indicator of financial 
health, but also as an indicator of past financial decision making and potential for a client to 
achieve a modification or forbearance in the future.  In qualitative interviews, HomeFree 
explained that they required all Project Restore participants to furnish or allow counselors to 
pull a credit report.  However, similar proportions of participants and nonparticipants do not 
have a reported credit score. 
After cleaning data to account for reporting errors, 4,263 nonparticipants had a credit 
score.  Those scores ranged from 398 to 832, with a median score of 568 and a skewed mean of 
587.  Project Restore credit scores ranged from 452 to 727 with a median score of 548 and 
mean score of 567.  Despite a low sample size of 77 reported scores and a higher standard 
deviation of 16 points, I am confident at the 5% alpha level that Project Restore clients 
represent a slightly lower average credit score than the overall client population.  Figures A2.11 
and A2.12 are histograms of the credit score distributions. 
  
As discussed above, PITI is a metric for the monthly payments related to the home, 
sometimes rolled into one check sent to the servicer.  While this number is particularly difficult 
for counselors to retrieve from clients at intake, it is a very important metric for understanding 
the size of a client’s debt responsibility compared to income and other variables.  PITIs that are 
high relative to income represent a potentially insurmountable burden for homeowners, often 
directly leading to late payments and defaults.  PITI is also a relatively important metric used by 
Figure A2.12 Credit Score Counts of Project Restore 
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Figure A2.11 Credit Score Counts of Nonparticipants 
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Figure A2.10 Income Distribution of Project Restore 
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loan modification programs to determine whether a particular monthly payment is sustainable 
relative to household income. 
The PITI data from HomeFree went through intense data cleaning because counselors 
were not consistent in their methods for obtaining or reporting the information.  Therefore, I 
threw out nearly 300 nonparticipant PITI reports and two Project Restore PITIs.  Among the 
reported PITIs with a high degree of certainty regarding validity, nonparticipant monthly 
payments ranged from $400 to $9,475 with a median PITI of $2,074 and a mean of $2,216.  
Assuming a 30-year fixed-rate loan at 7% interest, a millage rate of .75% and insurance 
premiums of 1.04%, that median PITI of $2,074 translates to a mortgage principal of $274,000 
while the mean PITI of $2,216 translates to a mortgage principal of $293,000. 
 Project Restore PITIs ranged from $800 to $5,650 with a median of $2,228 and a mean 
of $2,543.  Using the same mortgage, tax, and insurance assumptions, the median PITI of 
$2,228 roughly translates to a mortgage principal of $294,000 while the mean PITI of $2,543 
yields an approximate principal of $336,000.ii  I cannot be sure at the 5% confidence level that 
there’s a difference between the PITI distributions of each sample.  Figures A2.13 and A2.14 
display the distributions of PITI by participation. 
  
Mortgage Information 
The data set also included several variables that reflected information on the financial 
status of the mortgage and the client’s reason for needing foreclosure mitigation assistance.  
However, many participants did not disclose certain aspects of this information.  For three 
specific variables – loan product type, reason for default, and loan status at intake – our 
analysis included dummy variables for lack of disclosure.  This method accounts for potentially 
systematic nondisclosure of the information.    
The loan product type variable explained the structure of the mortgage.  Almost 47% of 
nonparticipants did not report this information while 40% of Project Restore participants did 
not disclose the structure of their loan.  Qualitative interviews with HomeFree suggested that 
many clients did not know or understand the structure of their mortgage, and therefore could 
not report this information.  In those cases, if the information was procured later in the process 
by a counselor, it was recorded in notes but not accounted for in the database.   
                                                     
ii
 Mortgage principal calculations generated using the “PITI Mortgage Payment Calculator” available at 
www.mortgage-info.com 
Figure A2.14 PITI Distribution of Project Restore 
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Figure A2.13 PITI Distribution of Nonparticipants 
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Overall, 34% of nonparticipant mortgages had a fixed interest rate, while almost 40% of 
Project Restore mortgages were fixed-rate.  Contrastingly, adjustable rate mortgages account 
for roughly 20% of both data sets.  Figure A2.15 displays a breakdown of the mortgages by 
treatment type. 
 
The loan status at intake variable explains the intensity of the delinquency for a specific 
loan.  Across both populations, approximately 11% of participants did not disclose this 
information.  Again, qualitative information led us to believe that a significant portion of 
nondisclosures occurred because the clients lacked knowledge about their debt product.   
Among those who disclosed their level of delinquency, nonparticipants skewed more 
heavily towards significant delinquency, with 39% more than 90 days late while only 34% of 
Project Restore participants were 90 or more days late.  5% more Project Restore participants 
were current on their mortgage at time of intake.  This number could imply that Project Restore 
participants were more likely to have foresight about potential default hazards based on their 
financial situations.  Figure A2.16 breaks down the data set by level of delinquency. 
 
The reason for default variable was a self-reported observation of why the client was 
having issues servicing their debt.  Nearly 13% of nonparticipants and 9% of Project Restore 
participants did not disclose this information.  HomeFree counselors had differing opinions on 
this high rate of nondisclosure, but I perceive that there might be some systematic bias for 
people who had risky adjustable-rate loans or altered their answers due to social desirability. 
Among those who disclosed a reason for their default, nonparticipants were more likely 
to respond that income was a reason, while Project Restore participants were more likely to 
report rising expenses as their primary reason for not servicing mortgage debt.  Income loss 
Figure A2.16 Summary of Delinquency Status for HomeFree Data Set 
    
Non PR PR 
Loan Status at Intake Code 
Count of 
LOANSTATUSATCONTACT 
Count of 
LOANSTATUSATCONTACT % % 
Current 1 1464 25 30.3% 35.2% 
30‐60 days late 2 863 11 17.8% 15.5% 
61‐90 days late 3 619 11 12.8% 15.5% 
91‐120 days late 4 461 7 9.5% 9.9% 
121+ days late 5 1431 17 29.6% 23.9% 
Grand Total 
 
4838 71     
 
Figure A2.15 Summary of Loan Product Type for HomeFree Dataset 
  
 
Non PR PR Non PR PR 
Loan Type at Intake Code 
Count of 
LOANPRODUCTTYPE 
Count of 
LOANPRODUCTTYPE % % 
Fixed under 8% 1 1639 26 30.5% 32.9% 
Fixed over 8% 2 199 5 3.7% 6.3% 
ARM currently under 8% 3 773 13 14.4% 16.5% 
ARM currently at 8% or greater 4 244 3 4.5% 3.8% 
Client did not disclose 11 2523 32 46.9% 40.5% 
Grand Total 
 
5378 79     
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meant that the client temporarily lost all income streams, while reduction in income implied 
that monthly household income fell, but not to $0.  Interestingly, Project Restore clients who 
reported that their reason for default was “loss of income” also reported some level of current 
income at intake above $0, implying those clients had already found a new source of income.  
Nearly 7% more Project Restore participants reported a reason that was coded “Other” by 
HomeFree.  Figure A2.17 breaks down the reasons for default for the entire data set by 
participation. 
 
Notably missing from the list of variables is a debt-to-income ratio and information for 
each client’s loan.  A debt-to-income ratio, commonly referred to as the front-end or back-end 
DTI, would provide some understanding of each client’s total credit picture.  This variable 
includes consumer credit and liabilities for goods and services like a cell phone, which helps 
underwriters and originators understand a consumer’s ability to repay new credit liabilities.  
Previous research, including many of the studies discussed in Chapter 3, suggests that the DTI at 
loan origination has a significant impact on a homeowner’s ability to avoid default.  DTI is also a 
key metric for loan modification.  We can assume that any HomeFree client who received a 
modification was able to maintain or lower their DTI below the thresholds set by industry-wide 
underwriting standards, normally 38% for low and moderate income borrowers. 
Loan information including the original loan amount, closing date, original loan-to-value 
ratio, and any forgivable or “soft second” loans that underpinned the down payment are all 
important for analyzing the current equity position of the client.  These metrics could also 
potentially elucidate a client’s eligibility for federal, state, and local mortgage support, including 
the federal programs outlined in Chapter 3.  This information would certainly strengthen an 
analysis of Project Restore’s impact on maintaining homeownership. 
 
 
Figure A2.17 Summary of Self-Reported Cause of Default for HomeFree Dataset 
    
Non PR PR 
Reason for Default Code 
Count of 
DEFAULTREASONCODE 
Count of 
DEFAULTREASONCODE % % 
INCOME REDUCTION AND LOSS 
     Reduction in income 1 1313 15 27.6% 20.8% 
Loss of income 3 1402 18 29.4% 25.0% 
OTHER CAUSES 
     Poor budget management skills 2 36 
 
0.8% 0.0% 
Medical issues 4 275 5 5.8% 6.9% 
Increase in expenses 5 254 7 5.3% 9.7% 
Divorce/separation 6 145 4 3.0% 5.6% 
Death of family member 7 81 2 1.7% 2.8% 
Business venture failed 8 30 
 
0.6% 0.0% 
Increase in loan payment 9 137 
 
2.9% 0.0% 
Other 10 1092 21 22.9% 29.2% 
Grand Total   4765 72     
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APPENDIX 3: STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY 
I initiated this study to determine whether or not the Project Restore model is better at 
helping HomeFree foreclosure clients keep their home compared to the traditional HomeFree 
foreclosure mitigation counseling process.  However, as previously outlined, there is 
tremendous variance in observable information about the clients and some clear biases 
inherent in sorting which HomeFree clients are appropriate for the Project Restore program.  
Therefore, before assessing whether or not Project Restore is better than standard counseling, I 
had to identify and control for those biases. 
These constraints of sorting bias and nonrandom treatment are common among 
observational studies.  The inherent limitations of using observational data to evaluate 
treatment effects have been well documented.28  Generally, observational data like the 
information used in this analysis lacks the benefit of randomized assignment, meaning there 
are a range of potential individual opinions and decisions that impact whether or not a 
particular subject receives treatment or not.  Social scientists have developed techniques 
intended to address this subjectivity issue by using mathematical models to control for 
“violation of the ignorable treatment assignment assumption,” control for other assignment 
bias, and account for “covariation among observed variables.”28 
Analysis Design 
This analysis employs several of those techniques in a three stage process.  First, in 
order to control for selection bias, I had to create a model that predicts whether not a 
HomeFree client would be selected for Project Restore.  For this study, I utilized a binary logistic 
regression to create a propensity score for each client.  That propensity score distills the 
likelihood of assignment to Project Restore based on a number of variables.  Creating that 
model requires identifying which variables are important predictors of assignment to Project 
Restore. 
Once I could predict whether or not a client is a good fit for project restore, the second 
stage of the analysis was finding a group of nonparticipants who fit into the model as well as 
the actual Project Restore participants.  For this task, I utilize a propensity score matching 
technique to create a smaller control population that reflects the same profile of controlled 
observation variables.  According to Guo, this methodology “corrects for selection bias… and 
violations of statistical assumptions that are embedded in multivariate models.”28  Concisely, I 
can perform tests between a matched sample of untreated clients and the Project Restore 
group as if the two samples were generated in a controlled, randomized experiment. 
Once I had a controlled sample, I could run a simple statistical test with treatment, in my 
case Project Restore participation, as the independent variable and continued homeownership 
as the dependent variable.  This test told me quantitatively and with relatively high confidence 
whether the experimental program had a statistically significant impact on a HomeFree client’s 
ability to maintain a home compared to receiving standard foreclosure mitigation treatment. 
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Analysis Phase I: Predicting Selection for Project Restore 
The Binary Logistical Regression 
In order to predict whether an individual client is appropriate for Project Restore 
participation, I used a logit model of binary logistical regression.  The binary logistical regression 
outputs a conditional probability of receiving treatment based on a series of explanatory 
variables.  In this case, when the observed information about a particular client is fed into the 
model, the output is a score indicating the likelihood that the client would be selected for 
Project Restore.  The equation for this model is: 
      
     
       
 
      is the propensity score of a particular client,  , being eligible for Project Restore 
based on a series of observed covariates named   . Since the output of this regression is 
nonlinear, I chose to utilize a common alteration to this formula.29  The logit version of this 
regression creates a linear function whose output distribution approximates a normal 
distribution.  However, the output is actually the natural log of the odds ratio.  The equation for 
this model is: 
                
  
    
          
In this case,    is the probability of a client being eligible for Project Restore and    is the 
list or array of explanatory variables.   
Both versions of the model effectively create a weight or coefficient for each 
explanatory variable.  Those coefficients can then be applied to any observed value of a 
variable, and when the products of all the observations and coefficients are summed you have 
a unique score representing the likelihood of eligibility for treatment.  Again, I utilized the 
             as my propensity score for each client since the output is linear, distributed 
normally, and therefore easier to interpret.iii   
Intricacies aside, if the model is well constructed, it will accurately predict whether each 
client was or was not a good fit for participating in Project Restore.  Using the propensity 
scores, I can sort the nonparticipant sample based on likelihood of being selected for Project 
Restore.  The next step is to identify which variables in the data set are appropriate to include 
in the regression 
Context for Selecting Variables and Controls 
In 1996, Roberto Quercia and Susan Wachter published a white paper discussing best 
practices for analyzing homeownership counseling and default outcomes.  They critiqued four 
existing studies, concluding with a suggested design for a comprehensive study that would help 
control for differences in the critiqued work.30  The study Quercia and Wachter suggest has 
never been executed due to cost and time limitations, but their theoretical framework is useful 
in this context.   
                                                     
iii
 For the analysis, I utilized the Stata statistical software program, version 10. 
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The authors identified a list of variables that should be controlled against ownership 
outcomes in a study of purchase counseling or financial education. That list of independent 
variables includes: 
1. Income 
2. Assets 
3. Household characteristics 
4. Previous homeownership 
5. Employment status and history 
6. Credit history 
7. Costs associated with owning compared to renting in a specific submarket 
8. Loan-to-value ratio 
9. PITI 
10. Changes in household composition 
11. Changes in employment 
 
This study is slightly different because some of the factors above, like assets, are 
intended to control for differences in underwriting standards across mortgage originators.  As I 
discussed above, the HomeFree population already has a loan, and I am more interested in 
controlling for their equity position and ability to repay their current debt liabilities.  Most of 
these variables are found in some form within our dataset, either explicitly or embedded within 
highly correlated information.  For example, I do not have costs associated with owning versus 
renting in specific submarkets.  However, having geocoded data for each client’s mortgaged 
property, I can control for each client’s residential submarket, which is a proxy for these costs 
as well as submarket variance in housing prices and employment opportunities. 
Variables explicitly requested by Quercia and Watcher that I am unable to account for in 
this analysis include changes over time in family composition and history of employment.  
Additionally, there are several potentially significant sorting biases not accounted for in this 
analysis which are also not controlled for using the previous list.  First, the program’s budget 
constraints meant that not all eligible participants were offered an opportunity to participate.  
Second, I cannot presume to understand the motivations of each client who elects to call 
HomeFree.iv  For example, while most are genuinely interested in assistance, some might be 
externally motivated by family to make contact.   
Third, once people are offered the choice to participate in Project Restore, they can 
choose whether or not to opt into the program.  There is a small fee associated with joining, 
which is one deterrent.  Another deterrent is the time commitment required for additional 
                                                     
iv
 There is very little concern that our Project Restore population will strategically default, based on the sorting 
effect that if they choose to enter the program, they are committed to staying in the home and meeting their 
potentially modified debt obligation.  However, a small portion of the overall population has an income to PITI 
ratio that suggests they could continue to maintain mortgage payments with relative ease compared to the rest of 
the population, if they chose to do so.  Interviews with HomeFree counselors reveal that some portion of this 
subgroup come through the intake process to better understand the ramifications of bankruptcy.  A smaller 
portion of other nonparticipants go through the intake process and realize that defaulting is financially 
advantageous.  A small number of each subgroup chooses to return the keys to the bank instead of continuing to 
pay down their mortgage.  The matching process should control for the former client profile, but not the latter. 
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classes and one-on-one counseling.  Some potential participants chose not to join the program 
because of time constraints.   
Finally, since counselors unilaterally decide whether or not to offer a client the option of 
participating in Project Restore, there is a large sorting impact that I cannot control. For 
example, I cannot account for a counselor’s opinions about the subjective components of a 
client’s personality or their lifestyle.  I also cannot account for the rapport between a counselor 
and particular client that might bias a counselor’s decision about that client’s eligibility.   
Testing Variables for Inclusion in the Logit Regression 
The reliability of the propensity scores to accurately predict implied eligibility for Project 
Restore hinges upon which variables are utilized in the regression.  I chose to test participation 
in Project Restore against each variable discussed in the previous chapter.  This test was done 
using a variation of the binary logistical regression formula shown above, but I ran the 
regression with each variable as the sole predictor of Project Restore participation to see if that 
variable had a statistically significant correlation to the participation outcome.  If the variable 
was statistically significant as an explanatory variable of participation at the 5% confidence 
level, I included that variable in the regression. 
The logistical regression technique is highly sensitive to which variables are utilized.  
Therefore, some variables are potentially good predictors on their own, but when applied to a 
multivariate regression, they become insignificant.  This is the nature of the logistical regression 
which accounts for colinearity and bias.  Therefore, two variables may be statistically significant 
predictors of Project Restore participation alone, yet they may also be internally correlated.  
The logistic regression takes this factor into account. 
Among the demographic variables, age, race, gender, and household type were all 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  In the financial health category, income as well as credit 
score and PITI were statistically significant.  Note that because of the highly irregular 
distribution of income, I utilized the square root of all incomes to achieve a more normal 
distribution of the variable as shown in Figures A3.1 and A3.2.  Also, I only ran the model with 
clients who had a valid PITI.   
  
Interestingly, none of the mortgage-related variables were indicators of Project Restore 
participation.  It seems that there is zero “identifiable sorting bias”28 based on the type of loan, 
level of default, or reported reason for defaulting on the loan.  For more information regarding 
the Phase I variable tests, see Appendix 4. 
Figure A3.2 Distribution of Income^(1/2) Variable 
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Figure A3.1 Distribution of Income Variable 
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For the final model, I dropped observations where household type or gender was not 
reported.  The final logistical regression used age, race, gender, household type, the square 
root of income, credit score, and PITI.  The model was a strong and accurate predictor of 
Project Restore eligibility, with statistical significance at the .1% alpha level, and a Hosmer and 
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test implying high relative accuracy.   
Checking the model against logic and instincts, I found that the odds ratios and 
probabilities move as expected.  This means that when I hold all other variables steady at their 
mean values in the model, hypothetical changes to a client’s income, credit score, or PITI all 
cause the likelihood of participation to move the way that qualitative interviews implied that 
they should.  For example, Figure A3.3 show that with all other variables ceteris paribus, low 
credit scores increase the likelihood of Project Restore participation, and marginal increases in 
credit score lower the likelihood of a client being a participant.   
 
 
Conversely, low incomes and low PITIs correlate to low likelihoods of participation.  As 
those variables are increased and all other variables are held constant, the probability of being 
eligible for Project Restore increases as well.  Figures A3.4 and A3.5 illustrate how changes in 
income and PITI variables, respectively, alter the relative likelihood of Project Restore eligibility. 
Figure A3.3 A HomeFree Client’s Relative Likelihood of Project 
Restore Participation at each Potential Credit Score 
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Once the regression model was set, I fed each observation into the linear equation 
utilizing the estimated    coefficients, retrieving a unique propensity score for each eligible 
client. 
Analysis Phase 2: The Match 
  The next step was to compare the observed treatment group, in this case the actual 
Project Restore participants, to the control group of nonparticipants based on propensity score.  
By matching the control clients whose propensity scores most closely align with participants, I 
built a new sample of control clients that would have been eligible for treatment.  This process 
replicates the blind random assignment mechanism and allows me to confidently compare the 
two samples as if they were randomly assigned to Project Restore. 
The method of “greedy matching” I chose for this process is called Nearest Neighbor 
Matching within a Caliper.  Again, I chose this particular methodology is because post-match 
samples can be compared using multivariate analyses while maintaining the “ignorable random 
Figure A3.5 A HomeFree Client’s Relative Likelihood of Project Restore 
Participation at each PITI Value 
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assignment assumption” based on the observed variables. For further explanation of the 
Nearest Neighbor Matching within a Caliper methodology, please consult Guo and Fraser.28  To 
reference the specific coding for this method, including the caliper constraints, please refer to 
Appendix 4. 
Figures A3.6 and A3.7 compare the distributions of the nonparticipant propensity 
scores, group 0, against the Project Restore sample, group 1.  A3.6 shows the whole 
nonparticipant population, while A3.7 shows the matched control sample.  The matched 
control sample appears very highly matched to the Project Restore group based on the 
observable covariates. 
  
The elegance of the propensity score matching system is that it allows for variance in 
specific variables among unique observations while matching the control sample based on 
overall fit to the Project Restore participants.  Comparing specific variables between the 
matched control sample and Project Restore participants reveals a slightly higher variance in 
the distributions.  For example, Figures A3.8 and A3.9 display the comparable distributions for 
income and the more normally distributed square root of income variable. 
  
Figures A3.10, A3.11, and A3.12 provide similar comparative information regarding 
distributions among the two matched samples for credit score, PITI, and age respectively. 
Figure A3.9 Income^(1/2) Distributions of Matched 
Samples by Participation 
 
Figure A3.8 Income Distributions of Matched 
Samples by Participation 
 
Figure A3.7 Propensity Scores of Matched 
Observations by Participation 
 
Figure A3.6 Propensity Scores of All Observations by 
Participation 
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Overall, the match provided a new control sample of 72 HomeFree nonparticipant 
clients who had very similar observable characteristics to the people who received Project 
Restore treatments.  As discussed above, there are several biases that we could not control in 
the regression, including an eligible participant’s choice not to enter the program.  However, 
with this control sample, I can compare the home retention outcomes of the two populations 
to test whether the Project Restore treatment had a significant impact on clients’ ability to 
maintain ownership of their homes. 
 
Analysis Phase 3: Testing Home Retention Outcomes 
Once I had a matched control sample, I could compare each sample based on their 
unique rates of home retention.  I defined home retention for each client as positive if the 
client still lived in the home they reported as their residence during intake.  To verify residency, 
I cross-referenced the geocoded address against the www.RealtyTrac.com database for any 
level of reported distress of preforeclosure to short sale.  I also tracked addresses against local 
property and tax records to verify that the client was still listed as the resident, that the taxes 
for the property were current, and that there were no liens against the residence that would 
suggest some level of default.   
Figure A3.11 Age Distributions of Matched Samples 
by Participation 
 
Figure A3.10 PITI Distributions of Matched Samples 
by Participation 
 
Figure A3.9 Credit Score Distributions of Matched 
Samples by Participation 
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I attributed a positive outcome observation, a one for the variable “stillhome”, when I 
could confirm that the client was still in the same residence using the methodology described 
above.  If I could not confirm that they were still in the home, “stillhome” was zero.  A logit 
regression testing participation against home retention showed that the experimental 
treatment was statistically significant in predicting whether someone could avoid home loss 
after counseling.  
In an additional analysis, I tested home retention against both Project Restore 
participation and modification status as covariates.  This logit regression is very strong in 
predicting whether a person can maintain homeownership, implying that both behavior 
modification and effective mortgage modification assistance are important factors in home 
retention.  Figure A3.12 is a table displaying the breakdown of outcomes for the entire 
population, including code definitions.  For the analysis, outcome was broken down into a 
binary variable defining “good outcomes” as one and “bad outcomes” as zero.  The outcomes 
considered good included codes 1, 15, 16 17, 53, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, and 109, which 
roughly equates to all modifications and other interventions that allowed distressed owners to 
stay in their homes.  Unknown outcomes were considered zeros for the purpose of the analysis.  
Figures A3.13 and A3.14 are histograms showing the frequency of each code among the two 
matched samples. 
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Figure A3.12 Reported Counseling Outcome Table 
        Non PR PR 
Counseling Outcome Code 
Count of 
Outcome 
Count of 
Outcome % % 
POSITIVE MODIFICATION OUTCOMES      
Brought Mortgage Current with rescue funds 1 1  0.0% 0.0% 
Mortgage Refinanced 15 36  0.7% 0.0% 
Mortgage Modified 16 982 26 18.3% 32.9% 
Received second mortgage 17 2  0.0% 0.0% 
Obtained partial claim loan from FHA lender 53 27 1 0.5% 1.3% 
Brought mortgage current (without rescue funds) 104 8  0.1% 0.0% 
Mortgage refinanced into FHA product 105 7  0.1% 0.0% 
Mortgage refinanced (non‐FHA product) 106 23  0.4% 0.0% 
Mortgage modified with PITI less than or equal to 38% with at 
least a 5 year fixed rate 
107 1496 30 27.8% 38.0% 
Mortgage modified with PITI greater than 38% or interest rate 
fixed for less than 5 years and appears to be sustainable 
108 401 6 7.5% 7.6% 
Mortgage modified with PITI greater than 38% or interest rate 
fixed for less than 5 years and appears not to be sustainable 
109 72 2 1.3% 2.5% 
NEGATIVE & UNKNOWN MODIFICATION OUTOMES      
Initiated forbearance agreement/repayment plan 2 149 2 2.8% 2.5% 
Executed a deed‐in‐lieu 3 9  0.2% 0.0% 
Property Sold 4 9  0.2% 0.0% 
Mortgage foreclosed 5 105  2.0% 0.0% 
Other 20 398 2 7.4% 2.5% 
NO DEFINITION 51 18  0.3% 0.0% 
Counseled and referred to another social service or emergency 
assistance agency 
52 12  0.2% 0.0% 
Bankruptcy 54 70  1.3% 0.0% 
Counseled and referred for legal assistance 56 162 1 3.0% 1.3% 
Withdrew from counseling 57 601 1 11.2% 1.3% 
Currently in negotiation with servicer; outcome unknown 100 624 4 11.6% 5.1% 
Referred homeowner to servicer with action plan and no 
further counseling activity; outcome unknown 
101 23  0.4% 0.0% 
Foreclosure put on hold or in moratorium; final outcome 
unknown 
102 3  0.1% 0.0% 
Homeowner(s) sold property (not short sale) 110 8  0.1% 0.0% 
Pre‐foreclosure sale/short sale 111 95 1 1.8% 1.3% 
Counseled on debt management or referred to debt 
management agency 
112 32 3 0.6% 3.8% 
Home lost due to tax sale or condemnation 113 1  0.0% 0.0% 
Grand Total   5374 79     
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Figure A3.14 Frequencies of Modification Outcome 
for Project Restore Sample 
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Figure A3.13 Frequencies of Modification Outcome 
for Matched Control Sample 
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APPENDIX 4: STATA OUTPUT 
Phase 1 – Testing Potential Variables for Logistic Regression 
Test for Race 
 
 
Test for Age 
 
 
. logit prcode agecontinuous 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -354.32147   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -353.28942   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -353.28132   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -353.28132   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       3669 
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       2.08 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.1492 
Log likelihood = -353.28132                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0029 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      prcode |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
agecontinu~s |   .0162395   .0111829     1.45   0.146    -.0056785    .0381576 
       _cons |  -4.720376   .5793176    -8.15   0.000    -5.855818   -3.584935 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. logit prcode racewhitecode racehispaniccode raceothercode 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -354.32147   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -349.43017   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -349.16485   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -349.16288   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -349.16288   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       3669 
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =      10.32 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0161 
Log likelihood = -349.16288                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0146 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      prcode |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
racewhitec~e |  -1.506906   1.012245    -1.49   0.137     -3.49087    .4770579 
racehispan~e |  -.8240636   .3213347    -2.56   0.010    -1.453868   -.1942593 
raceotherc~e |  -.1550406   .4726071    -0.33   0.743    -1.081334    .7712523 
       _cons |  -3.669243   .1378066   -26.63   0.000    -3.939339   -3.399147 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Test for Gender 
 
 
Test for Income 
 
 
. logit prcode income 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -354.32147   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -347.27474   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -346.78182   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -346.78031   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -346.78031   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       3669 
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =      15.08 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0001 
Log likelihood = -346.78031                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0213 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      prcode |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      income |   .0060043   .0014432     4.16   0.000     .0031756    .0088329 
       _cons |   -5.14663   .3407302   -15.10   0.000    -5.814448   -4.478811 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. logit prcode  malecode 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -354.32147   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -352.76332   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -352.74706   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -352.74706   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       3669 
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       3.15 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0760 
Log likelihood = -352.74706                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0044 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      prcode |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    malecode |  -.4249369    .241365    -1.76   0.078    -.8980036    .0481299 
       _cons |  -3.711828    .156177   -23.77   0.000     -4.01793   -3.405727 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Test for PITI 
 
 
Test for Credit Score 
 
 
. logit prcode creditscore 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -354.32147   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -352.84705   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -352.82767   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -352.82766   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       3669 
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       2.99 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0839 
Log likelihood = -352.82766                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0042 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      prcode |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 creditscore |  -.0024113   .0014341    -1.68   0.093     -.005222    .0003994 
       _cons |  -2.517559   .8253175    -3.05   0.002    -4.135152   -.8999669 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. logit prcode piti 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -354.32147   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -352.2145   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -352.09323   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -352.0929   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -352.0929   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       3669 
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       4.46 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0348 
Log likelihood =  -352.0929                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0063 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      prcode |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        piti |   .0002563   .0001152     2.22   0.026     .0000305     .000482 
       _cons |  -4.508221   .3059547   -14.73   0.000    -5.107881   -3.908561 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Test for Loan Product 
 
 
Test for Level of Default 
 
 
. logistic prcode i. loanstatusatcontact 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       3435 
                                                  LR chi2(4)      =       1.11 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.8931 
Log likelihood = -321.70743                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0017 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      prcode | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
loanstatus~t | 
          2  |   .8855932   .3301915    -0.33   0.745     .4264476     1.83909 
          3  |   1.065022   .4106261     0.16   0.870     .5002334    2.267487 
          4  |   .9984985   .4378295    -0.00   0.997     .4227716    2.358245 
          5  |   .7452929   .2517769    -0.87   0.384     .3843897    1.445048 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. logistic prcode i.loanproducttype 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       3669 
                                                  LR chi2(4)      =       1.64 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.8020 
Log likelihood = -353.50253                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0023 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      prcode | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
loanproduc~e | 
          2  |   1.925686   .9654797     1.31   0.191     .7208074    5.144602 
          3  |   1.068282   .3840643     0.18   0.854     .5280386    2.161257 
          4  |   .8902352    .550995    -0.19   0.851     .2646482    2.994612 
         11  |   1.113738   .3139653     0.38   0.702      .640955    1.935258 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Test for Reason for Default 
 
 
 
  
. logistic prcode i.defaultreasoncode 
note: 2.defaultreasoncode != 0 predicts failure perfectly 
      2.defaultreasoncode dropped and 30 obs not used 
 
note: 8.defaultreasoncode != 0 predicts failure perfectly 
      8.defaultreasoncode dropped and 24 obs not used 
 
note: 9.defaultreasoncode != 0 predicts failure perfectly 
      9.defaultreasoncode dropped and 94 obs not used 
 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       3238 
                                                  LR chi2(6)      =       4.91 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.5554 
Log likelihood = -319.80942                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0076 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      prcode | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
defaultrea~e | 
          2  |  (empty)   
          3  |   1.181467   .4244649     0.46   0.643     .5842666    2.389089 
          4  |   1.298444   .7430328     0.46   0.648     .4229845    3.985861 
          5  |   2.126641   1.051752     1.53   0.127     .8067215     5.60615 
          6  |   2.210273   1.427445     1.23   0.219     .6233335    7.837388 
          7  |   2.428571   1.867059     1.15   0.248      .538216    10.95835 
          8  |  (empty)   
          9  |  (empty)   
         10  |   1.718424   .6112585     1.52   0.128     .8557567    3.450723 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Phase 2.1 – Binary Logistic Regression 
 
Binary Logistical Regression of Project Restore Estimation Model 
 
 
Goodness-of-Fit Tests 
 
 
. lfit 
 
Logistic model for prcode, goodness-of-fit test 
 
       number of observations =      3669 
 number of covariate patterns =      3669 
           Pearson chi2(3656) =      3562.91 
                  Prob > chi2 =         0.8622 
. logistic prcode raceblackcode racehispaniccode raceothercode income agecontin 
> uous malecode singlecode fsparentcode msparentcode marriednodepscode twounrel 
> atedownercode creditscore piti 
note: twounrelatedownercode omitted because of colinearity 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       3669 
                                                  LR chi2(12)     =      39.10 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0001 
Log likelihood = -334.76978                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0552 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      prcode | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
raceblackc~e |   4.512583   4.609424     1.48   0.140     .6094758    33.41134 
racehispan~e |   2.981642   3.153103     1.03   0.302     .3752363    23.69223 
raceotherc~e |   4.272115   4.730075     1.31   0.190     .4877472    37.41891 
      income |   1.005387   .0016253     3.32   0.001     1.002207    1.008578 
agecontinu~s |   1.009039    .012319     0.74   0.461     .9851805    1.033475 
    malecode |   .6668635   .1918713    -1.41   0.159     .3794264    1.172051 
  singlecode |   1.236542   .4396693     0.60   0.550       .61596    2.482362 
fsparentcode |   1.288412   .4885425     0.67   0.504     .6127657    2.709037 
msparentcode |   2.833973   1.458467     2.02   0.043      1.03356    7.770616 
marriednod~e |   2.962195   1.091784     2.95   0.003     1.438414     6.10019 
twounrelat~e |  (omitted) 
 creditscore |   .9978979   .0014961    -1.40   0.160     .9949699    1.000835 
        piti |   1.000127   .0001297     0.98   0.326     .9998733    1.000382 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. estat classification 
 
Logistic model for prcode 
 
              -------- True -------- 
Classified |         D            ~D  |      Total 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
     +     |         0             0  |          0 
     -     |        72          3597  |       3669 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
   Total   |        72          3597  |       3669 
 
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5 
True D defined as prcode != 0 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)    0.00% 
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)  100.00% 
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)       .% 
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   98.04% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)    0.00% 
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)  100.00% 
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)       .% 
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)    1.96% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Correctly classified                        98.04% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
. linktest 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -354.32147   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -339.14006   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -334.64538   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -334.6228   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -334.62278   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       3669 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      39.40 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -334.62278                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0556 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      prcode |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |   .4925566   .9805912     0.50   0.615    -1.429367     2.41448 
      _hatsq |  -.0713577   .1358416    -0.53   0.599    -.3376024     .194887 
       _cons |  -.8632456   1.760606    -0.49   0.624    -4.313971     2.58748 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Phase 2.2 – Nearest Neighbor Matching within a Caliper 
 
Nearest Neighbor Matching Method Stata Code 
 
 
*NOTE: specify your working directory here* 
cd "C:\Documents and Settings\bryanh\My Documents\Match Attempt" 
 
*find appropriate transformation for income* 
gladder householdincome 
gen income=sqrt(householdincome) 
 
*remove cases who did not report gender or family type* 
*(note: this removes only 3 treatment cases in total)* 
drop if genderdnrcode==1 | otherfamilytypecode==1 | familytypednrcode==1 
gen piti=pitiatintake if flagpiti==1 
 
/* Logistic regression model predicting Project Restore participation. 
Covariates include: race (reference white), income (square root to adjust for 
skew), 
age (continuous), gender (1=male), family structure (reference married with kids), 
credit score (continuous), piti (only valid cases included)*/ 
 
logistic prcode raceblackcode racehispaniccode raceothercode income /// 
agecontinuous malecode singlecode fsparentcode msparentcode marriednodepscode /// 
twounrelatedownercode creditscore piti 
eststo 
estout using genworth.txt, cells(b(star fmt(3)) t(par fmt(2))) stats(r2 bic N) /// 
label title(Predicting Project Restore participation) /// 
legend varlabels(_cons Constant) replace 
eststo clear 
 
predict p1 
drop if p1==. 
gen logit1=log((1-p1)/p1)   
sum logit1 
label var logit1 "Propensity score" 
save score, replace 
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Nearest Neighbor Matching Method Stata Code, continued 
 
 
 
 
  
//distribution of estimated propensity scores 
histogram logit1 if prcode==1, normal xtitle("Project Restore Participants") 
saving(p1.gph,replace) 
histogram logit1 if prcode==0, normal xtitle("Nonparticipants") 
saving(p0.gph,replace) 
graph combine p1.gph p0.gph, xcommon ycommon /// 
  saving(hist,replace) title("Histograms of Estimated Propensity Scores") 
graph box logit1, over(prcode) saving(box,replace) /// 
  title("Boxplots of Estimated Propensity Scores")  
 
set seed 1000 
generate x=uniform() 
sort x 
psmatch2 prcode, pscore(logit1) caliper(.266825) noreplacement descending 
sort NEWID_v1 
save match1, replace 
g match= NEWID_v1[_n1] 
g treat= NEWID_v1 if _nn==1 
drop if treat==. 
sum treat 
keep treat match prcode 
save scheme1, replace 
 
clear 
use scheme1, replace 
keep treat prcode 
gen tx=1 
rename treat NEWID_v1 
save t1.dta,replace 
clear 
use scheme1, replace 
keep match prcode 
gen tx=0 
rename match NEWID_v1 
append using t1.dta 
sort NEWID_v1 
save t2.dta,replace 
 
clear 
use match1, replace 
 
sort NEWID_v1 
merge NEWID_v1 using t2.dta 
tab tx 
drop if tx==. 
save post1, replace 
 
logistic RefundLeft_v1 prcode 
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Phase 3 – Post-Match Homeownership Retention Test 
 
Test of Project Restore Treatment Against Home Retention 
 
 
Test of Reported Modification Outcome Against Home Retention 
 
 
Test of PR Treatment and Reported Modification Outcome Against Home Retention 
 
 
. logistic stillhome prcode outcomecode 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        144 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =       8.79 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0123 
Log likelihood = -23.599492                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1570 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   stillhome | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      prcode |   4.615464   5.141648     1.37   0.170     .5199634    40.96924 
 outcomecode |   5.889298   5.147998     2.03   0.043     1.061707    32.66798 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. logistic stillhome outcomecode 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        144 
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       6.31 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0120 
Log likelihood = -24.837913                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1128 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   stillhome | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 outcomecode |   7.573532   6.511126     2.36   0.019     1.404438    40.84082 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. logistic stillhome prcode 
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        144 
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       4.14 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0418 
Log likelihood =  -25.92188                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0740 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   stillhome | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      prcode |   6.454533   7.058499     1.71   0.088     .7568577    55.04468 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Goodness-of-Fit Tests for Multivariate Post-Match Model 
 
 
 
 
 
. linktest 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -27.994357   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -23.605833   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -22.912205   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -22.912126   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -22.912126   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        144 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =      10.16 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0062 
Log likelihood = -22.912126                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1815 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   stillhome |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |    3.81171   2.676482     1.42   0.154    -1.434099    9.057519 
      _hatsq |  -.4680473   .4273431    -1.10   0.273    -1.305624    .3695299 
       _cons |  -3.412142   3.349927    -1.02   0.308    -9.977878    3.153593 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. lfit 
 
Logistic model for stillhome, goodness-of-fit test 
 
       number of observations =       144 
 number of covariate patterns =         4 
              Pearson chi2(1) =         1.57 
                  Prob > chi2 =         0.2100 
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. estat classification 
 
Logistic model for stillhome 
 
              -------- True -------- 
Classified |         D            ~D  |      Total 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
     +     |       137             7  |        144 
     -     |         0             0  |          0 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
   Total   |       137             7  |        144 
 
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5 
True D defined as stillhome != 0 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)  100.00% 
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)    0.00% 
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   95.14% 
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)       .% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)  100.00% 
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)    0.00% 
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)    4.86% 
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)       .% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Correctly classified                        95.14% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
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